Kassa (Abebaw) v. State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 16 (Apr. 29, 2021) by Diaz, Cecilia
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law 
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals 
2021 
Kassa (Abebaw) v. State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 16 (Apr. 29, 2021) 
Cecilia Diaz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs 
Recommended Citation 
Diaz, Cecilia, "Kassa (Abebaw) v. State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 16 (Apr. 29, 2021)" (2021). Nevada Supreme 
Court Summaries. 1405. 
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1405 
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository 
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please 
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu. 
Kassa (Abebaw) v. State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 16 (Apr. 29, 2021)1 
 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION – APPELLANT GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL OF FIRST-




 Appellant Abebaw Tesfaye Kassa was found to be mentally ill, but nevertheless guilty of 
first-degree murder and first-degree arson. Kassa was found guilty on the aforementioned charges 
and contested his conviction arguing that the district court falsely instructed the jury on voluntary 
intoxication and erred in denying his motion to vacate the jury’s verdict and find him not guilty by 
reason of insanity. This Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support Kassa’s 
convictions and the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the challenged instruction. 
The district court’s decision is affirmed.  
 




 In 2016 Kassa set fire to the transitional home for persons with mental illness. Kassa had 
previously lived there for over a month. The residents of the transitional home escaped, but Lolita 
Budiao, the housekeeper, was trapped by Kassa in a bathroom and suffered severe injuries of which 
she later died. Kassa fled the scene by escaping through a window as the police arrived. The police 
gave chase, Kassa resisted arrest, and he was ultimately arrested.  
 
 Kassa was charged with first-degree felony murder and first-degree arson, admitted to the 
facts and Budiao’s death, and raised an affirmative defense of insanity. Kassa alleges he suffered 
from schizophrenic auditory hallucinations when he set the fire, and introduced expert testimony 
by two psychiatrists who examined him in the years since the fire to support his defense. The State 
presented medical records noting that when the prospect of murder charges arose, Kassa reported 
that he’d been snorting “Spice,” a synthetic version of marijuana with hallucinogenic effects. 
Kassa reported that the mental effects of Spice left him feeling disturbed and unable to sleep. Partly 
based on this evidence, the State proposed jury instruction no. 20 explaining to jurors that 
voluntary intoxication – as opposed to mental disease or defect – did not make resulting conduct 
“less criminal.”  
 
 The jury found Kassa guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”) on both counts. Under NRS 
175.533, a jury can find a defendant GBMI if a defendant is found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the offense and due to disease or defect of the mind was mentally ill during the 
commission of the crime. Finding in such a manner by a jury means that the defendant’s mental 
illness is not excusing their criminal conduct, the result is not an acquittal, but a guilty verdict 
signals certain allowances in sentencing.2 Kassa moved to have the verdict vacated and not be 
found guilty by reason of insanity. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and 
 
1  By Cecilia Diaz.  
2  See Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 554, 27 P.3d 66, 70 (2001) (noting that with a GBMI verdict, “the district court 
may suggest that the prison system provide certain types of treatment to the convicted individual”).  
sentenced Kassa to serve concurrent prison terms totaling 20 years to life in the aggregate. This 




 During trial, Kassa conceded to starting the fire intentionally, intending for it to cause 
deaths, intentionally starting the fire knowing people were inside the home, intentionally holding 
Budiao captive in the bathroom to prevent her from stopping the fire, and that Budiao died as a 
result. From the testimony, the jury could have inferred the Kassa committed the crimes charged. 
This case deals with whether his conduct was excused from criminal liability based on a not guilty 
by reason of insanity defense (“NGRI”).3For such a defense to be viable, Kassa’s alleged insanity 
defense must satisfy the M’Naghten test “[(1] tie to a disease or defect of the mind,” he suffered 
from delusions such that he did not “(1)  [k]now or understand the nature and capacity of his . . . 
act; or (2) [a]ppreciate that his or  her conduct was wrong.”4 After his conviction, Kassa moved 
the district court for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to NRS 175.381(2), on his supposed 
satisfaction of M’Naghten. But NRS 175.381(2) set a higher bar where if the record contains 
evidence on which any rational juror may convict, then its high standard is not met. The district 
court found that Kassa did not clear this high standard.5  
 
 De novo review applies from an order denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal, where 
appellate court must determine whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in 
deciding the motion.6 Because the district court decides a motion for a judgment of acquittal under 
NRS 175.381(2) based on a sufficiency of the evidence standard, appellate review of an order 
denying such a motion is the same as a review of the sufficiency of the evidence.7 Kassa’s path to 






 The record supports the district court’s decision that if a reasonable juror looked at the 
evidence, they would have concluded that Kassa did not satisfy M’Naghten. Whether or not Kassa 
has a mental illness, the State’s case benefits from an initial presumption of legal sanity. Kassa 
had the burden of rebutting this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.8 This 
presumption operates most critically during the time the offense was committed.9 The State did 
 
3  See Finger v. State, 117 Nev. at 568, 27 P.3d at 80 (stating that “legal insanity simply means that a person has a 
complete defense to a criminal act”). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6)(b); see Finger, 117 Nev. at 556-57, 27 P.3d at 72-73 (discussing M’Naghten's 
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 209–10 (1843), and describing the resulting test).  
5  Purcell v. State, 110 Nev. 1389, 1394, 887 P.2d 276, 279 (1994).  
6  See Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1193, 926 P.2d 265, 279 (1996); United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 602 
(9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the court reviews de novo a denial of a motion for acquittal under analogous Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 29).  
7  Purcell, 110 Nev. at 1394, 887 P.2d at 279; See Evans, 112 Nev. at 1193, 926 P.2d at 279. See also United States 
v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2012). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6). See Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 26, 588 P.2d 1027, 1028 (1979).  
9  Ford v. State, 102 Nev. 126, 135, 717 P.2d 27, 33 (1986).  
not deny the proffered evidence of Kassa's history of delusions and hallucination. Neither the 
evidence nor his psychiatric diagnosis established legal insanity for the NGRI defense – 
M’Naghten hinges on the temporal and causal connection between Kassa's mental illness and the 
crime.10 
 
 If the jury had credited the testimony given by Kassa’s psychiatrists, then an NGRI might 
have been reached, but as Kassa’s conceded during oral argument: the jury was not obligated to 
accept the expert’s testimony.  
 
 The psychiatrists testified that Kassa denied using drugs two years before the crime had 
occurred. However, in opening and closing arguments, the State noted that medical records from 
two days after the fire show Kassa giving a detailed account of using Spice. The reports state the 
Kassa used Spice and had a history of using it and felt disturbed and unable to sleep after he 
consumed the drug.  
 
 A reasonable jury could have elevated these medical records over the testifying expert 
opinions, because they were self-serving information Kassa supplied two years after the event.11 
Notably, one of Kassa’s experts agreed that his use of Spice could not be ruled out at the time the 
fire was set.  To the extent the jury reasonably believed that Kassa's use of Spice created delusions 
or led to arson, they likewise correctly rejected his NGRI defense where M’Naghten's causal 
requirement holds that the operative delusion result from a “mental disease or defect,” and would 




 There is no need to rely on Kassa’s use of Spice because sufficient evidence alternatively 
supports Kassa’s failure to meet the M’Naghten test.13 M’Naghten sets a narrow standard where 
delusional beliefs are grounds for legal insanity when the delusions, if true, justify the commission 
of the crime.14 Even at face value, accepting Kassa suffered delusions, and that they were caused 
by a defect of the mind rather than his use of Spice, a reasonable jury could conclude that he did 
not meet the M’Naghten requirement.  
 
 Kassa presented contradictory testimony, where one psychiatrist reported that Kassa, under 
some delusion, had lit the fire “to die fully” and escape his reanimated body. Another psychiatrist 
 
10  Id. at 136, 717 P.2d at 33.  
11  See Clark, 95 Nev. at 28, 588 P.2d at 1029–30 (finding that the jury reasonably rejected an NGRI defense where 
“[t]he expert opinions were largely based on information supplied to the psychiatrists by appellant over a year 
subsequent to the commission of the crime, which information was markedly sharp in contrast to statements given 
police more proximate to [the crime]”).  
12  State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 79, 70 P.2d 1113, 1118 (1937) (stating that “voluntary intoxication furnishes no 
excuse for crime committed under its influence”) (quoting 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal 
Law § 400 (7th ed. 1882)), overruled in part on other grounds by Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957). 
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(10)(a) (stating that an exonerating “[d]isease or defect of the mind” for purposes of 
Nevada's M’Naghten test “does not include a disease or defect which is caused solely by voluntary intoxication”).  
13  Cf.  Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 10, 38 P.3d 163, 169 (2002) (noting “that a jury may return a general guilty 
verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the alternative even if one of the possible bases of conviction is 
unsupported by sufficient evidence”).    
14  Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 577, 27 P.3d 66, 85 (2001).   
suggested that under his delusions some outside forces had directed him to set the fire. In either 
case, Kassa understood the “nature and capacity of his . . . act” and knew he was setting a fire 
because he added clothing and furniture as kindling that caused the home to burn and those in it – 
intending the fire to be deadly.15 It is unsurprising that one of Kassa’s psychiatrists testified that 
Kassa did not show impairment and knew he was setting fires that burned to burn his reanimated 
body. The evidence presented is enough for a jury to reject Kassa’s NGRI under M’Naghten.16  
 
 As to the second part of the M’Naghten test, a jury could have inferred that Kassa 
appreciated that his conduct was wrongful, specifically because he trapped Budiao in a bathroom 
despite her screaming to be let out and knowing she’d attempt to stop the fire. Although one of 
Kassa’s psychiatrists noted that the smell of smoke might have triggered a survival instinct in him, 
Kassa nevertheless escaped the fire himself and resisted arrest. Thus, a reasonable jury could infer 
that Kassa knew the wrongfulness of his actions.17 
 
 Even if a jury believed that Kassa was suffering from delusions, a defect of the mind, or 
some other condition not borne from Spice use, the facts support that Kassa was aware of his 
actions and that the fire would harm those occupying the home and is not sufficient to establish 
legal insanity.18 Further, any suggestion that the testimony by experts necessitates an acquittal is 
misdirected the factfinder may discredit their testimony and rely on other probative evidence to 




 Kassa’s second argument in favor of reversal centers on jury instruction no. 20 which 
instructed that an act committed by a person while voluntarily intoxicated is not deemed less 
criminal, even if the intoxication is so severe as to make the person unconscious of what they’re 
doing or even make them temporarily insane.20  
 
 The district court has broad discretion in settling matters regarding jury instructions, and 
this court reviews the lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion or judicial error.21 This 
Court reviews de novo whether a jury instruction is a correct statement of law.22 Even if the 
instruction is given in error, reversal is not required unless a different result would be likely.23 
 
 
15  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6)(b)(1).   
16  See Buford v. State, 793 S.E.2d 91, 94 (Ga. 2016) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support rejection of 
defendant's NGRI defense where one of two testifying experts was uncertain as to whether the defendant met the 
test's requirements).  
17  See Edwards v. State, 90 Nev. 255, 260, 524 P.2d 328, 332 (1974) (noting that an attempt to flee the scene of a 
crime “is a circumstance supportive of an inference of guilt”).  
18  See Finger, 117 Nev. at 576, 27 P.3d at 85 (explaining that defendant is entitled to acquittal under the M’Naghten 
test only “if the facts as he believed them to be in his delusional state would justify his actions”).  
19  2 Catherine Palo, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173 (Supp. 2020). See Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 28, 588 P.2d 
1027, 1029 (1979) (noting that expert “testimony is not binding on the trier of fact, and the jury was entitled to 
believe or disbelieve the expert witnesses”).  
20  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.220; State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 79, 70 P.2d 1113, 1118 (1937). 
21  Newson v. State, 136 Nev. 181, 185, 462 P.3d 246, 249-50 (2020).  
22  Hager v. State, 135 Nev. 246, 257, 447 P.3d 1063, 1072 (2019). 
23  Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 416, 92 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2004).  
 Kassa suggests that a court may not allow jury instructions that vary from applicable 
statutory language, which is untenable, and argues that the district court should not have permitted 
any instruction on voluntary intoxication and its impact on the NGRI defense.24 Kassa failed to 
raise any objections to instructions no. 14 and no. 17, both dealing with the effect of voluntary 
intoxication on the NGRI defense and cover the same matter as instruction no. 20.25 
 
 Further, Kassa could not show prejudice from the district court’s inclusion of these 
instructions.26 The instructions given opened an avenue for the jury to acquit Kassa, had Kassa 
argued on the alleged facts because arson is a specific intent crime which can be defeated by 
proving involuntary intoxication.27 Kassa may also have intended to object to instruction no. 20 to 
argue that the phrase “temporary insanity” was prejudicially confusing. NGRI defenses only 
require that the defendant be legally insane at the time of the offense but have no bearing on 
whether the alleged insanity was temporary or long-running. Instruction no. 20 integrates only a 
related statement of law.28 Read as a whole, instructions no. 20 distinguishes mental disease or 
defect from voluntary intoxication, where only the former can result in acquittal under 
M’Naghten.29  
 
 The State also clearly and correctly used the language in instruction no. 20 and explained 
that to be legalally insane, the mental state must be derived from mental defect or disease and not 
borne out of drug use.30 Kassa argues that the State also bears the burden of proving a theory of 
intoxication. Here, Kassa already stipulated to the admission of medical records proving his drug 
use in statements made two days after the fire. Kassa’s experts also spoke on the effects of Spice 
on a person’s mental state and that the use of Spice could have caused his alleged delusions. For 




Kassa was found guilty but mentally ill on the charges and contests his conviction arguing 
that the district court misinstructed the jury on voluntary intoxication and erred in denying his 
motion to vacate the jury’s verdict and find him not guilty by reason of insanity. This Court found 
sufficient evidence in the record to support Kassa’s convictions and the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in giving the challenged instruction. The district court’s decision is affirmed. 
 
 
24  See Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 1050-51, 13 P.3d 52, 58-59 (2000) (admonishing district courts to tailor 
instructions to the case, rather than merely quote applicable statutes)  
25  Instruction no. 14 (instructing that in the NGRI context, “[v]oluntary use of drugs or alcohol do not constitute a 
severe mental disease or defect. The voluntary use of drugs or alcohol must be disregarded”) and instruction no. 17 
(instructing that a “[d]isease or defect of the mind' does not include a disease or defect which is caused solely by 
voluntary 
Intoxication”).  
26  Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 416, 92 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2004).  
27  Ewish v. State, 110 Nev. 221, 228, 871 P.2d 306, 311 (1994), on reh’g, 111 Nev. 1365, 904 P.2d 1038 (1995). 
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220.  
28  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220. See Fisko, 58 Nev. at 79, 70 P.2d at 1118.  
29  Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 844, 849, 944 P.2d 240, 243 (1997).  
30  Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 786, 263 P.3d 235, 259 (2011) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion 
in issuing particular jury instruction “[b]ecause three other instructions informed the jury that the State bore the 
burden of proof and the same need not be stated in every instruction”).  
 
 
Dissenting Opinion Summary 
 
 SILVER, J., with whom HARDESTY, C.J., and STIGLICH, J., agree, 
dissenting: 
 The judgment of conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The district 
court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication because the State did 
not present enough evidence to give the instruction.31 At the suggestion of the State the district 
court gave a confusing instruction because the instruction implies that Kassa could be found insane 
and criminally liable of the offense committed.32 Instruction no. 20 contradicts other instructions 
(no. 14 and no. 17). The majority correctly notes that the test for legal insanity is demanding and 
requires a jury to be instructed correctly on the M’Naghten standard.33 The instructional error was 
not harmless because the contradictory instructions likely confused the jury.    
 
Dissenting Opinion Facts and Procedural History  
 
 In 2016 Kassa lived in a community-based group home for individuals with mental illness 
where he resided without incident for a month. On July 27, 2016, Kassa started a fire where the 
live-in caretake died. Kassa was charged with first-degree arson and felony murder and pled not 
guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”). Kassa bears the burden of proving to that due to mental 
disease he was delusional during the time he committed the offense resulting in his inability to 
understand the nature of his conduct or appreciate his wrongful behavior.34  
 
 Before trial Kassa was evaluated by psychiatric experts and determined incompetent to 
stand trial. After six months or treatment and medication Kassa regained competence for trial. One 
of Kassa’s experts testified and diagnosed him as schizophrenic and concluded he was legally 
insane when he started the fire. Kassa filed an NGRI, and the State obtained an independent 
psychological evaluation where the State’s expert reached the same conclusion as Kassa’s expert 
witness.  
 
 Kassa’s expert witness explained that individuals with schizophrenia develop symptoms 
during their mid-to-late 20s, and mental health professionals first diagnosed Kassa in 2011 with 
reports of hallucinations since 2008. Kassa’s witness detailed several episodes Kassa had showing 
symptoms of schizophrenia such as hearing voices, incoherent screaming, and a variety of 
hallucinations, ruling out malingering. Kassa’s expert explained that during the fire, Kassa 
experienced two types of delusions where Kassa believed himself to have been in a car accident 
and that he was unable to control his body because external forces were animating his dead body. 
In his delusion, Kassa understood the concept of fire and used it to destroy his already dead body. 
Kassa’s expert believed that his delusions prevented him from understanding his actions were 
wrong, and that he meets the NGRI standard.  
 
31  Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 249, 699 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1985).  
32  Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(4) (excepting from criminal liability “[p]ersons who committed the act charged or 
made the omission charged in a state of insanity”).  
33  Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 577, 27 P.3d 66, 85 (2001).  
34  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6)(a)–(b).  
 
 The State’s psychiatrist reached the same conclusions and added that Kassa believed he 
was already dead and in heaven. While the State’s expert found that Kassa understood he was 
starting a fire, he concluded that Kassa did not understand that other people could be harmed or 
that the fire would have serious consequences. The State’s expert concluded that Kassa, in the 
depths of his psychotic delusion, did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. 
 
 Both psychiatric experts concluded that Kassa was legally insane, the State presented no 
further evidence to rebut this testimony, and instead the State argued that Kassa was not insane but 
under the influence of Spice The State’s expert did not opine that Kassa’s use of Spice caused his 
psychotic episodes, but the State persisted in arguing that Kassa was temporarily insane due to his 
intoxication. This point of argument by the State created confusion between insanity and voluntary 
intoxication. Kassa objected to the State’s language where voluntary intoxication causes 
“temporary insanity” because it would confuse the jury.  
 
 This Court explained that to warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction the evidence must 
show that the defendant consumed an intoxicant and the intoxicating effects of the substances on 
the defendant’s mental state.35 In Nevius, the defendant testified that he had wine and smoked 
marijuana but did not establish the intoxicating effects of those substances on his mental state 
resulting in the district court properly rejecting the defendant’s voluntary intoxication instruction.36 
The Nevius standard should apply to the State as well, and in this case they have not met the burden 
of proof.  
 
 Here, the State did not even establish that Kassa consumed Spice. The State relied solely 
on Kassa's medical records and paraphrased it during closing arguments that Kassa admitted to 
using some sort of substance which made him feel agitated afterwards. The State’s account of 
Kassa's alleged intoxication is problematic. First, Kassa’s use “of using some type of substance” 
fails to show what substance, if any, Kassa ingested. Although the medical records referred to 
Spice, the State’s own expert witness posited that Kassa described being “anointed with some kind 
of an incense or perfume” the day prior, which casting Kassa’s Spice use as part of his delusions. 
Second, even assuming Kassa ingested Spice, the State presented no compelling evidence that 
established the intoxicating effects. Because Kassa suffered under a delusion that he was already 
dead and his body was animated by external forces, his description of “feeling disturbed and unable 
to sleep” sheds little light on his mental state.37 the State did not establish what, if any, substance 
Kassa consumed, the amount ingested, or how the effects he described related to the offense. The 
district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication.  
 
 While the instruction on voluntary intoxication should not have been given, the district 
court failed to ensure that the instruction given was correct. Instruction no. 20 misstated the law 
and confused the narrow standard applied to the insanity defense.38 Although the instruction 
largely tracks NRS 193.220, part of the instruction does not appear in the statute. Parts of the 
instruction imply that temporary insanity is not a defense. That is incorrect, as Nevada law allows 
 
35  Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 249, 699 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1985).   
36  Id.   
37  Nevius, 101 Nev. at 249, 699 P.2d at 1060.    
38  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220.     
the insanity defense to be based on insanity during a temporary interval of time, i.e., temporary 
insanity.39 The defendant can be legally sane before or after the criminal act and legally insane at 
the time of the offense.  
 The record indicates that the State and district court relied on State v. Fisko for part of 
instruction no. 20, but that case confused the defenses of temporary insanity and diminished 
capacity.40 In Miller this Court explained that those defenses are mutually exclusive because 
diminished capacity is present only in the absence of insanity, and temporary insanity requires 
proof of insanity.41 The language the State used from Fisko implies that intoxication can create 
temporary insanity, but Nevada law states that voluntary intoxication cannot alone result in legal 
insanity.42 This Court should overrule Fisko to the extent it implies that voluntary intoxication 
alone can cause temporary insanity, therefore instructing the jury that “voluntary intoxication” can 
“create a temporary insanity” is an erroneous statement of law and abuse of discretion by the 
district court. 
 
 The relationship between the insanity defense and voluntary intoxication is significant. 
Kassa presented expert testimony that he was legally insane at the time of the crimes and the State 
contended that it presented evidence that Kassa ingested an intoxicating substance before the 
crimes. That relationship was concisely and clearly addressed in jury instruction 
no. 17, which followed an instruction explaining that the insanity defense requires proof of a 
disease or defect of the mind that does not include a disease or defect caused by voluntary 
intoxication. Instruction no. 20 confused the jurors even more by suggesting that intoxication on 
its own could give rise to temporary insanity, and implied that temporary insanity is not a defense. 
Instruction #14 further confused the jurors by telling them that the voluntary use of substances 
must be disregarded when determining if the defendant could appreciate the nature and quality of 
his acts. In Nevada voluntary intoxication cannot be the only cause of mental disease to support 
an insanity defense, but it can be a contributing factor.  
 
 The jury was faced with internally inconsistent and confusing instructions, and this Court 
should not expect jurors to be legal experts or make legal inferences regarding the meaning of the 
law.43 the majority highlights this data argument that Kassa’s delusional mental state must be from 
mental defect and cannot be derived from the ingestion of Spice. However, the state negating that 
principle by first telling the jury in closing argument that instruction no. 20 says that no act 
 
39  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6)(a) (requiring the defendant to prove he “was in a delusional state at the time of the 
alleged offense”) (emphasis added)); Miller v. State, 112 Nev. 168, 174, 911 P.2d 1183, 1186–87 (1996) (“[A] 
person can benefit from the M'Naghten insanity defense if he shows he was insane during the temporal period that 
coincides with the time of the crime. Technically and semantically, such a finding is temporary insanity.” (citation 
omitted)). 
40  58 Nev. 65, 78–79, 70 P.2d 1118 (1937) (describing defendant's diminished capacity defense based on voluntary 
intoxication as “temporary insanity” that “furnishes no excuse for [the] crime committed” (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS 
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 400 (7th ed. 1882)).   
41  Miller v. State, 112 Nev. 168, 173–74, 911 P.2d 1183, 1186–87 (1996). See also Diminished Capacity, Black's 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “diminished capacity” as “[a]n impaired mental condition—short of 
insanity—that is caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease and that prevents a person from having the mental state 
necessary to be held responsible for a crime”). 
42  State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 79, 70 P.2d 1113, 1118 (1937); See NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(10)(a) (“’Disease or 
defect of the mind’ [for purposes of the insanity defense] does not include a disease or defect which is caused solely 
by voluntary intoxication.”).  
43  Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 754, 121 P.3d 582, 588 (2005).  
committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal. 
Instruction no. 20 allowed the jury to conclude that Kassa was both temporarily insane and 
criminally liable.44 
 
 The voluntary intoxication instruction did not benefit Kassa, while it's true that voluntary 
intoxication may negate specific intent, it also opened a door for the State to confuse the jury and 
persuade him to disregard evidence of classes legal insanity by focusing on his consumption of 
Spice.45 The error in giving jury instruction number 20 was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the misplaced emphasis on the alleged use of spies certainly affected the jury's verdict.46  
 
Dissenting Opinion Conclusion 
 
 The district court erred in giving a voluntary intoxication instruction and further confuse 
that error by giving an instruction that misstated and confused the intricate and precise standard 
for legal insanity, thus making jury instruction no. 20 more injurous than instructive. The 
instruction likely affected the jury's verdict and therefore was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Accordingly, the district court's judgment should be reversed and remanded for new trial 
based on the instructional error.  
 
44  See Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 568, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (2001) (providing that “legal insanity simply means that a 
person has a complete defense to a criminal act based upon the person's inability to form the requisite criminal 
intent”).  
45  Nevius, 101 Nev. at 249, 699 P.2d at 1060  
46  Miller v. State, 112 Nev. 168, 175, 911 P.2d 1183, 1187 (1996) (reversing a conviction where the prosecution and 
district court misinterpreted the insanity defense and hopelessly confused the jury).  
